Introduction
Increasing the share of renewable fuels in the energy mix is a prominent topic in today's debate on how to mitigate climate change and how to reduce import dependency on fossil fuels. Germany aims at increasing the share of renewable fuels in electricity generation to 30% in 2020, and provides a feed-in tariff in order to encourage the production of green electricity. This subsidy is paid by the electricity consumer by means of a levy on top of its electricity price. According to the German Government, a levy of 1.1 euro-cent per kilowatt-hour (ct/kWh) was raised in 2008, while the levy more than doubled since 2004 (BMU 2007 (BMU , 2008 .
Numerous empirical studies have examined the extent to which people are willing to pay price premia for green electricity, and have found a substantial market potential.
1 However, these studies typically consider a situation in which consumers act as sovereigns and people are free to decide whether to consume green electricity. By contrast, the German feed-in tariff commits all consumers to pay for a certain economy-wide electricity mix, in which the share of renewable fuels continually increases.
While this political decision triggers the market outcome in terms of a specific electricity mix associated with a specific levy, people must not necessarily approve this policy. The question arises to what extent the population consents on this financial obligation. Against this backdrop, this paper aims at assessing the maximal levy that can be charged for a specific electricity mix in Germany, such that a majority of people eligible to vote would approve the political commitment.
We analyze in the retrospective for 2008 whether the policy maker have acted on behalf of their voters; we further consider two future green electricity scenarios -which are both in line with the national target of 30% green electricity -and provide insights into the voter's preferences for reasons of political guidance.
Building on data from a large-scale survey among several thousand households in Germany, we trace peoples' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for specific mixes of fossil, renewable, and nuclear fuels in electricity generation. Using random parameter econometric techniques within a hedonic regression framework, we estimate household-specific WTP as a function of the electricity mix, and thereby capture various degrees of heterogeneity between the households. Using these results, we proceed with calculating people's WTP within the respectively considered situation, and juxtapose the WTP figures with rising scales of the levy.
By these means we elicit what cost might be imposed on the population for a specific electricity mix such that a majority of people eligible to vote would still endorse that policy. Our results stress an actual dilemma for the energy policy:
despite the fact that most people obviously dislike nuclear fuels in electricity generation, their willingness-to-pay for assisting renewable fuels is also limited. Thus, finding the right balance between the charged levy and a sustainable electricity mix might become a challenging task.
The remainder of the paper reads as follows. The following Section 2 describes the design of our survey, the survey instrument and the sample. Descriptives of respondents' WTP as well as regression results follow in Section 3. These results serve for investigating voters' preferences for two green policies scenarios considered in Section 4. Possible limitations of an empirical framework using stated preferences are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 finally concludes. Lancaster (1966) emphasizes that goods purchased in the market are not always the immediate source of utility, but that people derive utility from the array of characteristics inherent in the particular good. Along these lines, we postulate that a consumer's WTP is linked to the characteristics of the good via a bid
Survey Design and Sample

Figure 1: Stylized Survey Pie Chart
What is the monetary amount that you would be willing to pay at most for the contract shown on the right hand side, given that electricity generated entirely from fossil fuels costs e100?
function. We assume that an individual i evaluates the good electricity by its underlying fuel mix and specify the bid function:
(1)
with the shares of fossil (coal, oil, gas), renewable (wind, photovoltaic, water), and nuclear fuels as the elements in the electricity fuel mix.
We have acquired our data by surveying households from an online panel, for which the survey institute recruits the households in a complex multi-stage procedure and ensures that the panel is representative for the German population. A set of socio-economic and demographic background information is automatically stored within the system. Each panel household is equipped with a "set-topbox" connecting the household's TV with the internet. Respondents can fill in the questionnaire using a remote control.
Several formats have been suggested to elicit WTP in surveys, each possessing specific weaknesses and strengths (see Frew et al. 2003 Moreover, since electricity is a good that respondents know from daily experience, we believe that ill-considered valuations are not a too large burden in our analysis.
Another potential drawback of the open-ended format is the possible occurrence of protest bids in the data, meaning respondents that either give a zero value to a good that has actually a value or assign an obvious invalid high value to the good (Halstead et al. 1992) . However, as our empirical analysis will show below, protest bids are not of importance in our data.
In the survey, each survey participant is presented with five hypothetical electricity contracts, differing in the fuel shares contributing to the electricity generation, and is asked to state his individual WTP for a contract with a specific fuel mix. Pie charts appear on the television screen that depict alternative mixes (see Figure 1 ). Underneath the pie charts, respondents state their WTP for the contract in a pre-specified field. We lack information about the actual individ- contract with 100% fossil fuels, and normalize its price to 100 monetary units.
Deviations in stated WTP from this benchmark can be interpreted as price premia or deductions associated with a specific variation in the fuel mix.
While in total 14 contracts are available (including the benchmark contract), we limit the evaluation task for each respondent to five randomly drawn alternatives. The grey-shaded area in Table 1 illustrates the set of contracts.
3 The ordering in which these five contracts are presented to the respondents may affect respondents' bids. For example, showing initially a contract with e.g. 25%
renewables in the fuel mix followed by an evaluation task with 50% renewables may give rise to a specific WTP pattern. This is the so-called 'ordering effect' (Bateman and Langford 1997, Clark and Friesen 2008) . Empirical evidence on the presence of ordering effects in contingent valuation studies is mixed (Boyle et al. 1993 ). To minimize ordering-related biases, we randomize the draws from the set of available contracts. Accordingly, each possible sequence of evaluation tasks that can be constructed from Table 1 has the same chance to been drawn, and the probability that the same sequence will occur twice is extremely low.
Thus, even if respondents' later bids are influenced by the its initial bid, ordering effects should not play a role at the sample level.
3 A stepwise variation of fuel shares has also been implemented in Menges et al. (2005) . Sample characteristics are given in Table 2 . About 79% of the sample households live in western Germany, which is conform with the regional distribution of the German population described by official census data. Because the questionnaire was addressed to the person who contributes most to the household income (the "household head"), the sample consists mainly of males. About 37 percent of the respondents have at least a high school degree. Average age is about 50 years. The typical participating household has a disposable equivalent income of e1,550 per month, and consists on average of 1.83 adults and 0.45 children.
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3 Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
The upper panel of Figure 2 provides descriptive statistics for the WTP responses while in the lower panel boxplots illustrate the distributions of the responses for every evaluated contract. Both panels exhibit the same structure: The topmost row refers to a contract with a mix of 75 percent fossil fuels, zero percent nuclear fuels and 25 percent renewable fuels. In the three adjacent rows, the nuclear share is held constant while the renewable share is increased in 25 percent steps.
In the rows five to eight (nine to eleven; twelve to thirteen), the nuclear share is held constant at 25 percent and, again, the renewable share is increased.
Figure 2 reveals two regularities. First, WTP tends to rise in the share of renewable fuels in the electricity mix. Take, for example, the rows nine to eleven, where fossil fuel is sequentially replaced by renewable fuel, keeping the nuclear share constant at 50 percent. Both the descriptive statistics and the boxplots depict that WTP rises in the share of green electricity, indicating a preference for green electricity generation. On the other hand, the figures in rows 1, 6, 10 and 13 suggest that the WTP tends to be decreasing in the nuclear share, indicating that nuclear fuels are perceived as an economic 'bad', lowering the utility of the typical consumer. Using rank-sum tests for trends across ordered groups (Cuzick 1985) , we test for differences in stated WTP across fuel mixes. Holding the nuclear share constant, the tests confirm a significant increase in WTP with a rising share of renewable fuels. In a like manner, holding the share of renewable fuels constant, the tests confirm a significant decrease in stated WTP as the nuclear share increases.
In our survey, we have chosen an open-ended format. Inherent in its nature is the problem that respondents may feel tempted to protest specific contracts being presented, meaning that respondents reject a specific electricity mix by 
Econometric Analysis
Estimation Method
Random-parameter techniques offer the required flexibility to cope with preference heterogeneity by allowing for the estimation of personalized regression coefficients β ik := β k + u ik . The random deviations u ik measure the deviation of individual i from the mean taste β k for a specific fuel k. Hence, β ik depicts an individual slope coefficient, and we assume that the u ik are normally distributed in the population, with a zero mean and an unknown standard deviation.
We model the individual WTP response for contract j = 1, . . . , 13 in linear form:
where x jk captures the mix of the k fuels in contract j. We include the share of renewables and the share of nuclear fuels in x jk , but drop the share of fossil fuels because of collinearity reasons. We refer to equation (2) -our most flexible specification -as model 1, and test the sensitivity of our results with respect to nested, less flexible specifications.
To this end, we re-estimate the random parameter specification but constrain the individual preferences to equal the mean taste, i.e we invoke u ik = 0 for all k and every individual. We refer to this second specification as model 2. Finally, in our third specification we further exclude the household characteristics included in z z z i from the analysis (i.e. δ δ δ = 0 0 0).
Econometric Results
The results from our three regression models are summarized in Table 3 , reporting the results for model 1 in the first and the second column, for model 2 in columns three and four, and for model 3 in the remaining columns. The upper panel of Table 3 reflects the coefficient estimates and respective standard errors (s.e.).
The middle panel reports the standard deviations for the random parameters in the respective models. The lower panel of Table 3 depicts likelihood-ratio statistics, clearly indicating that the random parameter specifications of model 1 provides a flexibility that boosts the model fit. In the following we will therefore concentrate the discussion on model 1.
The WTP is increasing in the share of renewable fuels, as suggested by the descriptives of the previous section. Compared to the benchmark contract with 13 pure fossil fuels, increasing the share of renewable fuels from zero to one by one -meaning switching from zero to 100% -raises the WTP by 22.23%. On the other hand, increasing the share of nuclear fuels in the electricity mix yields a substantial decrease in average WTP. All the reported standard deviations for the random parameters distributions are highly significant (see the middle panel of Table 3 ), indicating that the u i vary substantially among individuals.
In other words, we observe considerable preference heterogeneity concerning the assessment of the various fuels.
Turning to the personal characteristics vector z z z i , we find that larger house- 
Evaluating Energy Policy Options
Renewable fuels accounted for some 15% in Germany's gross electricity generation in 2008, while about 23% came from nuclear fuels. With almost 60% the lion's share of Germany's electricity generation relies on fossil fuels, while the remaining 2% were generated using "other fuels" (BMWi 2010:19). 8 The German government aims at redesigning the energy system towards an economic, sustainable and secure energy supply. A German particularity is the nuclear phase-out on which the government and the electricity producer had agreed upon in 2002.
While this agreement is still in force, there is a lively and ongoing discussion about a possible recurrence of nuclear energy in power generation.
Renewables shall become the most important fuels in the future electricity mix. The German government has committed to enhance the renewable share in domestic electricity generation to at least 30% in 2020. In order to assist the generation of green electricity, Germany provides a feed-in tariff regime. In 2008, the total subsidy payments amount to 8.7 bn Euros and are expected to reach 12.7 bn Euros in 2010. Selling the generated green electricity at the market yields sales revenues but since the feed-in tariff exceeds the market price by a large amount (depending on the renewable technology), 9 a difference remains for which every household in Germany is committed to pay a levy. 
Assessment and Scenario Set-Up
Whether a household favors one fuel mix -associated with a respective levy - and rearranging Equation (3), we obtain an upper bound for the levy The two hypothetical scenarios 30a and 30b both refer to the commitment of the German government to increase the share of renewable fuels in the electricity generation to 30% until 2020. While we increase the renewable-fuel share by 15 percent points in scenario 30a (compared to the "status-quo") at equal expense of the shares from the other two fuels, fossil and nuclear, the rise in the renew-able share in scenario 30b causes a 1:1 reduction of the nuclear share. Against this backdrop, we quantify the maximal levy levels chargeable, such that still a majority of people supports the policy.
Our econometric results render the preference structure for every single sample household, providing the information on whether household i maintains a positive ΔCS s i in Equation (3). In order to derive representative population statistics, we weight each sample household by the household's frequency weight.
The frequency weights extrapolate the sample households in order to best fit the German micro-census statistics, and consider three household characteristics for extrapolation: monthly household net income, household size, and region of residence (Germany's 16 federal states).
10 In a second step, we multiply every (weighted) household by its number of adults (age 18 and older) and end up with the number of potential voters in the household. In this regard, it is a minor assumption that we assume identical preferences for all adult persons in a sampled household. 
Scenario Outcomes
Using the preference structure inferred from model 1, Figure 4 illustrates the public support as a function of the levy. The ordinate renders the share of people who are willing-to-pay at least the respectively charged levy, and the horizontal dashed line marks the share of 50% of people. If the marker of an associated scenario falls below the horizontal line, the respective levy will be no longer accepted by the majority of people. For instance, the downward sloping line pertaining to scenario s = 15 shows a rapidly falling acceptance of subsidizing 10 The frequency weights are derived using the software 'Adjust' (for further information see Merz (1994) ), which relies on an entropy based minimum information loss principle. The software incorporates a numerical solution by means of a modified Newton-Raphson procedure with a global exponential approximation. 11 As a referee noted, there is a difference between a registered and a typical voter. We lack information about the voting behavior of our sample households. Therefore our results reflect the preferences in the population eligible to vote and not the actual outcome of an election. The dotted and the triangular line refer to the scenarios s = 30a and s = 30b, respectively. Both scenarios enlarge the share of renewable fuels in the electricity generation and provide valuable information with respect to the scope of the levy that might be charged for a future fuel mix. The public support is highest in s = 30b where renewable fuels are extended only at the expense of nuclear fuels: 50% of the people would accept a levy of at most 2.37 ct/kWh to subsidize green electricity. In scenario s = 30a the extension of renewable fuels reduces the contribution of nuclear and fossil fuels, and nuclear fuels would still contribute more than 15% to the electricity supply. The median voter would accept in that scenario a levy of at most 2.03 ct/kWh. The public acceptance vanishes in both scenarios if the charged levy would exceed 6 ct/kWh.
The policy implications of our results are straightforward and challenging.
On the one hand, the German population strongly dislikes nuclear fuels in the electricity generation. On the other hand, substituting nuclear by renewable fuels is only a possible option if the associated levy won't increase too much, since the peoples' acceptance of such a policy has its (financial) limits. The challenging task is to find a balance between greening the electricity mix and the verification not to escalate the subsidy spending. Germany's feed-in-tariff promotes various renewable fuels but lacks a mechanism to limit the public spending. Consequently, already in 2010 a levy 2.047 ct/kWh will be charged -associated with an estimated renewable fuel share of about 18%.
Possible Limitations of Stated-Preferences Approaches
Stated preference approaches have the central advantage that the survey question can be designed in a way that it directly addresses the research question, even if the market design prevents inference from revealed preference data. In our case, for instance, both the levy and the electricity mix are triggered by a political decision and therefore given to the consumer. Consequently, data on the revealed demand of green electricity do not reflect consumer preferences, meaning that a revealed preference approach is not feasible.
Inherent in the nature of surveys, however, is the absence of a mechanism that ensures that rational agents have an incentive to reveal preferences truthfully. Though Hanemann (1994:37) emphasizes that "there is no reason why observing people's behavior and asking them about behavioral intentions and motives should be mutually exclusive", there is still a debate whether survey respondents "mean what they say" (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001) .
12 In our case, for example, not revealing the true WTP has no immediate negative consequences for respondents as contracts provided had been hypothetical, and stated WTP levels had no financial consequences. In the absence of opportunity costs, however, "customers can have a tendency to de-emphasize price, since they do not actually have to pay the price" (Goett et al. 2000:27) . The difference between stated and revealed values is referred to as "hypothetical bias." Carson et al. (1996) review more than 600 studies, and demonstrate that stated preference tasks typically average about 90% of the corresponding revealed valuation, hence, slightly underestimate the benchmark of revealed valuation. Murphy et al. (2005) conduct an econometric meta-analysis of hypothetical bias, and found evidence of a positive but small bias. They conclude that hypothetical bias "may not be as significant a problem in stated preference analyses as is often thought" (Murphy et al. 2005:323) . Along these lines, studies from the recreational choice literature have often found no statistically significant differences between demand functions derived from revealed and hypothetical data.
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With respect to green electricity, Champ and Bishop (2001) and Poe et al. (2002) provide evidence that a hypothetical character of the evaluation task yields a pos-itive bias, meaning that hypothetical values overstate actual (revealed) values.
Though we cannot ensure that our WTP estimates overstate the " true" values, such a pattern would even strengthen our results: if our respondents would actually pay less than stated, the public support for any level of the charged levy would decrease. Then, our results should be conceived as an upper bound for the underlying population preferences.
A reliable exposure of preferences requires that stated preferences remain stable between evaluation tasks (Hanemann 1994) . To investigate whether this is the case, we have confronted all our respondents with a further assessment problem. More precisely, each respondent was presented five attributes of electricity contracts, including the absence of nuclear fuels in electricity generation and electricity generation using renewable fuels. The participants were asked to rank these attributes with respect to desirability, with the largest rank indicating the most important attribute (see the Appendix for further details). Preferences remain stable if responses in both survey parts are consistent, meaning e.g. that a strong preference for green fuels is associated with a high individual regression coefficient, and also a high rank for the attribute "electricity generated from renewable fuels". A consistent representation of preference for renewable fuels would therefore require a positive correlation between the individual regression coefficient and the attribute's rank. By contrast, a preference against nuclear fuels is consistently reflected in a low individual regression coefficient for the nuclear share, accompanied by a high rank of the attribute "nuclear-free electricity generation". We thus expect a negative correlation between the individual regression coefficient for nuclear fuels and the respective attribute.
Indeed, Spearman rank correlation coefficients exhibit the expected signs and are highly significant. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the individual parameter for the share of green electricity and the rank for the contract attribute "electricity generation from renewable fuels" is 0.2814 and significant at the level p < 0.001. Likewise, the Spearman rank correlation between the individual parameter for the share of nuclear fuels and the rank for the absence of nuclear fuels in electricity generation amounts to -0.3050 at p < 0.001.
Conclusion
The German government has committed to increase the share of renewable fuels in electricity generation to at least 30% until 2020, and provides a feed-in tariff to encourage green electricity generation. This subsidy is financed by a levy on top of the consumer electricity price, amounting to 1.1 ct/kWh in 2008. While the cost of the subsidy scheme is shifted to the consumer due to a political decision,
it is an open question whether the policy maker act on behalf of the preferences of the voting majority. This paper provides insights into the people's preferences for greening the electricity mix and renders guidance for policy makers against the backdrop of green electricity commitment for 2020.
In a first step, we use a large-scale household survey to elicit peoples' preferences for different fuels in the electricity generation. We capture preference heterogeneity among the respondents by applying random parameter regression techniques within a hedonic approach. Our results suggest that the majority of our respondents has a positive WTP for renewable, and a negative WTP for nuclear fuels, both characterized by a substantial variability.
Using these WTP estimates we gauge in a second step the maximal chargeable levy for a specific fuel mix, such that a majority of people would approve that policy. We evaluate three different scenarios, one of which consists of the actual fuel mix of 2008. We find that the actual charged levy of 1.1 ct/kWh exceeds the WTP for slightly more than 50% of the population, meaning that the actual policy barely has the support of the majority of voters. We further determine the maximal chargeable levy for two hypothetical future fuel mixes, both characterized by a share of 30% renewables but different shares of nuclear fuels. According to our results, the charged levy should not exceed 2.03 ct/kWh in order to ensure the approval of the voters' majority. If the renewable fuels predominantly substitute nuclear fuels, the maximum chargeable levy increases slightly to 2.37 ct/kWh.
An increase of the share of renewable fuels in electricity generation thus expands the chargeable levy. However, our results also stress that the possible financial scope to support renewable fuels is basically exhausted. In particular, a levy of 2.047 ct/kWh will be charged already in 2010 -an amount close to the maximum chargeable levy of 2.37 ct/kWh -while the estimated renewable share of 2010 amount only to about 18%. As a consequence, energy policy must amplify its efforts in making the future promotion of green electricity less cost intensive.
While the current feed-in tariff fosters many generation techniques -even if they are far from any price competitive level -a reasonable policy redesign might initiate some extent of competition between renewable generation techniques. A possible approach would encompass, for instance, a bidding scheme, meaning the introduction of an upper bound for the annually subsidy spending, and the supported generation techniques have to compete for these scare financial resources.
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Example. The price of the benchmark contract (electricity entirely generated from fossil fuels) is e100. If you are willing-to-pay at most, say, e70 for an alternative contract, please state '70' in the empty box. If you are willing-to-pay at most, say, e180 for the alternative contract, please state '180' in the empty box.
Of course, all other values are feasible.
In the following, the benchmark contract (electricity entirely generated from fossil fuels and with a price of e100) will always appear at the left part of your screen.
The right part of your screen will show an alternative contract, where electricity is generated using different shares of the three fuels (fossil, renewable, nuclear).
[Technical note. Each respondent had to state her willingness-to-pay for five alternative contracts, drawn randomly from a set of 13 different contracts. All values between 0 and 9999 monetary units were feasible.]
Eliciting Respondent's Attribute Rankings
If you think about your own supply with electricity, which of the following product attributes is the most important for you?
• reasonable electricity price
• nuclear-free electricity generation
• electricity generated from renewable fuels such as water, wind, and photovoltaics
• price guarantee
• short term of notice Note. Figure has the same structure as Table 1 . From left to right: Share of renewable fuels rises from 0 percent to 100 percent (25 percentage steps). From top to bottom: Share of nuclear fuels rises from 0 percent to 75 percent (25 percentage steps). The abscissa gives the willingness-to-pay in Euro. The ordinate gives the density.
